

The Case for Developmental Methodologies in Democratization

Sara N. Ross

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Abstract Interdisciplinary integration of adult and political development knowledge into the study and process of countries' democratic transitions is necessary, so democratization does not become an incendiary process further destabilizing the planet. The incoherence in research and practice can be resolved by employing insights into the political reasoning, culture, and institutional structures at key stages of development. Drawing on Chilton's (1988, *Defining political development*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner; 1991, *Grounding political development*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner) theory of political development, this coherent micro/macro connection is required for study of the central co-reinforcing elements for stable democracy: civil society, political society, rule of law, usable state bureaucracy, institutionalized economic society, and cultural conditions for psychologically healthy power relations. Developmental analyses of these factors provide the compelling theoretical framework the political science of democratization requires.

Keywords Adult development · Civil society · Cognitive development · Consolidated democracy · Cultural development · Democratization · Micro/macro connection · Political development · Political reasoning · Political science

Perhaps, we once felt justified in leaving the process and study of democratization in the hands of political scientists and economists, and governments in transition. No more. If

the struggles in many countries across the globe to become and stabilize as democracies did not get our attention in the decades before 9/11, surely in the unfolding of that and subsequent events, we recognize the cost of not integrating the adult development field with political science. Now we know how governance structures produce ripple effects planet-wide, from cavalier “haves” to the “havenots” unable to feed, medicate, and educate their populations, from oppressive monarchies and dictatorships that unwittingly breed young men (and women) into terrorists, to regimes that shelter or cannot capture terrorists, to war plans of one government to oust another, and the list goes on. Countless analyses since 9/11 reveal the world that we finally realize we live in. There is no question that *interdisciplinary* analyses and practices are required for moving forward. Thus, my intended audiences are the political science and adult development psychology communities. In this article, I make the case for integrating developmental perspectives where they can play their essential role in addressing central questions in today's volatile world. Democratization is clearly one of those central questions, now more than ever, as pressure mounts on, and early signals are sent by stable and unstable regimes heading into or already reeling under the efforts toward democratization. If myths and confusions about the process are not dispelled now, democratization itself will be an incendiary process further destabilizing the planet.

This article builds its case through a report of the state of theory and research into democratization at the time of this writing, a diagnosis and presentation of what is needed, and a sketch of interdisciplinary scaffolding for a new stage of the work. Finally, it points to a compelling theoretical compass to guide the way to a new generation of democratization efforts in theory, research, and implementation.

S. N. Ross (✉)
ARINA, Inc., 3109 State Route 222, Bethel, OH 45106-8225,
USA
e-mail: sara.ross@global-arina.org

The Study of Democratic Transitions—A Ship Adrift

It was somewhere beyond the halfway point of my survey of the democratization literature that I encountered an assessment that mirrored the one I was beginning to form myself. In her introduction to a volume she says is representative of much of the American political science literature on democratization, Anderson (1999) notes the literature is

like a ship that has slipped its mooring...[it has] been set adrift, as analysts cast about for any plausible association, any reasonable correlation, in predicting the initiation or explaining the consolidation of democratic transitions. Yet it is neither plausible nor reasonable to expect that elites whose societies have little semblance of the bureaucratic capacity, military power, or international recognition we associate with statehood in the contemporary world would be able to initiate and sustain a democratic transition (p. 11).

There is broad agreement (e.g., Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Zuern 1999) that the literature has gone through its own transitions since the “third wave” of democratization in the late 1970s to early 1980s. From that early time of expectant possibilities, the next decade was characterized by optimism about the inevitability of wide spread democratic transitions. Transitions were recognized as being dynamic processes. By the early 1990s, pessimism had set in, as numerous young democracies failed to consolidate and thereby exist. Survival as a democracy is no longer assumed. Efforts to cobble together bits and pieces of explanations fail to produce a coherent story line about the transition drama. As Haggard and Kaufman (1995) draw conclusions from their study, they confess “[t]he absence of compelling theory on which to draw, and the complex and variegated nature of the political and economic transformations we examined, posed major challenges for both research and exposition” (p. 367).

Setting a New Course

The new direction for the study of—and efforts toward—democratization should be characterized by neither optimism nor pessimism, but rather, by *realism*. The pointers to this direction already abound in the literature and it is time to pull them together deliberately and explicitly. As far back as 1970, Rustow (1999) proposed shifting democracy studies toward the genetic inquiry of how a democracy “comes into being in the first place” (p. 17). Recognitions a decade ago of the processual nature of transitions echo this dynamic adaptive system clue, as do researchers who explicitly emphasize the system interactions involved in

transitions (Watters et al. 1996), and those who infer it (e.g., Linz and Stepan 1996; Haggard and Kaufman 1995).

The genetic epistemology of this field, itself, reveals that the dialectic resolves in the realistic synthesis of turning to genetic epistemology, itself, for its great “potential power of clarification” for political science (Rosenberg et al. 1988, p. 39). Originating in Piaget’s lifelong study of the biological functions of intelligence’s organization and adaptation, this theory is about the interactions of the human organism’s knowledge with the environment, just as democratization is. The structure of thought, and the mechanisms of its development are studied by this cognitive science to explain how “the human mind go[es] from a state of less sufficient knowledge to a state of higher knowledge” (Piaget, as cited in Rosenberg et al. 1988, p. 40). Genetic epistemology provides democratization studies with a “decoding device,” and without such a focus, they join as that whole “field of social change becomes as chaotic as its subject” (p. 158). Individual and collective development dynamics account for the leaps aptly identified in Anderson’s foregoing quote.

Cognitive science studies the *deep structures* of thought processes that exist in all humans. Upon reflection, we realize that we are usually so attentive to the *content* of what people say and do, that we do not notice the patterns of the sparse, deep, and underlying *structures* of thought governing various behaviors. This is the first and foremost distinction to internalize before this discussion gets underway. Piaget’s (and others’) work establishes that *how* humans’ mental operations function at various stages and sub-stages is cross-culturally universal (Commons et al. 2002; Kegan 1982; Rosenberg et al. 1988). The *content* and *cultural context* varies with individual, culture, and situation. Genetic epistemology is about universal deep structures of thought that *underlie* the specific content or context.

Glaringly absent from all of the literature I studied, is consideration and reflection of the differences in peoples’ political reasoning and human needs reflecting their stage of human development and social conditions. I find this is because, as Rosenberg et al. (1988) explain,

This [developmental] claim runs contrary to the cognitive assumptions which underlie both liberal and sociological theories of politics. Although these two theories vary in their assessment of individuals’ capacities, both assume that all individuals think in fundamentally the same way. Moreover, both types of macro-political analysis depend on this assumption of common cognitive capacity...[However, the] assumption of individual differences in cognitive processing suggests that the same objective environment will be understood differently and therefore

responded to differently by different individuals (pp. 16–17).

The micro-level attention to individuals and the macro-level attention to institutions at various scales is the most essential set of relationships assumed in this article, that all political dynamics are simultaneously individual and collective and are interpenetrated by the culture. The micro/macro dynamics of politics—our ways of relating with others and institutions—will be treated as “givens” rather than further defended in this space, since many have already established that connection (e.g., Briggs and Peat 1989; Chilton 1991, 1988; Fisher et al. 2000; Gustavsson 1994; Habermas 1979; Levy 1992; Progoff 1985; Schwable 1992). Reflecting a developmental micro/macro connection, anthropological insights are included in some sections, and the closing discussion makes the theoretical linkage with political culture.

Building Developmental Understandings

As the final step in laying foundations for my thesis, the purpose of this next section is to convey just enough of the structural dynamics of thought, and its intimate relation with meeting core needs, to be serviceable reference points for the rest of the article. In the course of doing so, the non-linear dynamics of human functioning may be inferred more than made explicit, for the sake of space. A further objective here is to disrupt some prevalent assumptions: (a) that people have the same capacities, and therefore, act and react the same to objective environmental factors; and, (b) that classes or categories of people and institutions (e.g., elites, workers, political parties, etc.) operate the same as others in the classification assigned to them. It is understood that involved in all human forms of behavior, there are two inseparably intertwined components, the affective (or conative) and the cognitive (Maslow 1987; Rosenberg et al. 1988). The conative component is the bundle of basic human needs, which are the motivating and striving energies of human behavior, and the cognitive component structures *how* behavior is aimed at satisfying the needs in their diverse hierarchical responses to the environment. In discussing the cognitive needs, Maslow (1987) stresses that desires to know and understand are themselves conative needs, and the distinction that “everyday conscious desires are to be regarded as symptoms, as *surface indicators of more basic needs*” (p. 30, emphasis in the original).

Introductory knowledge of the cognitive structures must include at least the basic nature of the mental operations performed by adults at various stages of development. Since the range of life conditions across the globe vary widely, many adults do not experience an environment or

culture that permits, encourages, or demands expanded capacities. Thus, readers of this article have likely developed some higher stages of cognitive complexity. Elsewhere, many adults are operating with the capacities this readership employed during childhood or adolescence (Commons et al. 2002; Rosenberg et al. 1988). Acknowledging the role of environmental conditions, Maslow (1987) also adds that what might actually be conceivable to attain—the sense of possibility—is “crucial for understanding the differences in motivations among various classes and castes within a given population, and among different countries and cultures” (p. 12).

Per Commons et al. (2002), in the primary stage of development, people can make simple logical deductions and understand rules of time sequence in their mental operations, which are similar to simple arithmetic of adding and multiplying, and talk about isolated objects such as “times, places, acts, actors” (p. 28). At the concrete stage, “distributive behaviors” derived from mental operations are like full arithmetic and people talk about “interactions, social events, what happened with [or] among others” (p. 28). For the sake of both brevity and simplicity, Rosenberg’s (1988, 2002) explication of his category of *sequential thinking* will en flesh, though briefly, the political implications of these two cognitive stages, primary and concrete.

Sequential Reasoning

The questions that concern this reasoning structure are “What does this look like? What do I do now? What happens next?” (Rosenberg 2002, p. 230). Answers come from the personal, concrete observations of experiences. Causation: There is an inability to separate parts and wholes, which results is not making real causal connections. Time horizon: Thinking occurs in real time in response to events happening and flowing in the present moment and immediately related future. Units of analysis: Sensate impressions of events as they happen are the objects of attention, and this concrete sensory memory can easily “mutate” current events into another “reality.” Rules: It is the concrete, contextual, personal routines that regulate behaviors rather than abstract rules of others. Such thinkers will “violate social norms with relative frequency and a commensurate lack of concern. As a result, social compliance depends on a close structuring of the environment to sustain...the desired behaviors...[and typically] this is bolstered by severe and very visible punishment for violations” (p. 239). According to Commons et al. (2002) sequential reasoning is adequate for functioning in the following settings: as an individual vendor or vendor clique; as individual cleaning person or other physical

laborer, artisan, etc. Such thinkers seek to meet their basic needs in ways consistent with their reasoning structure, with immediacy and little thought to consequence.

The main characteristics of sequential political reasoning can be understood by examining the following categories. Political understanding: The political and social domains intermingle without discrimination, and are confined to concretely seeing the particular things particular people do. The political world is ignored as of little value because it is “not-here, not-now” (Rosenberg 1988, p. 105). Political space: Limited to concrete observation, intangible or otherwise abstract notions are inaccessible, such as classes of people, race or ethnicity, institutions of any kind including nations, freedom, rules, rights, and responsibilities. At most, there is a fragmentary collection of isolated observations. Political actors: Consistent with observations of isolated objects or events, other people are not perceived as agents with causative roles. Others are not placed into mental categories of any kind, though sequential thinkers may value concrete symbols (e.g., a monarch’s crown, a soldier’s weapon, the flag), and may be able to recite what a leader has said, and understand it as an intermixed part of an event. Political action: With such sensate memory and without causal analytical ability, such individuals do not think about political action or alternatives to what is. They might readily join a protest happening on the street today, without understanding its origin or purpose, and judge its merit on the basis of its pleasing or displeasing sensory quality.

The next two stages of development are, in Piaget’s terms, abstract and formal operations. Both of these are dualistic thought structures. Commons et al. (2002) describe the abstract stage as considering variable times, places, acts, actors, states, and types. Stereotyping is typical, as are categorical assertions such as *all*, *none*, *never*, *always*, *everyone*. These characteristics derive from the ability to make an abstract connection between common features observed, but inability to discriminate among other variables at the same time. This stage mentally coordinates concrete systems available to it, such as the concepts of guilt, fairness, interest, affection, and can think in variables like slow–fast, hot–cold, good–bad, nice–mean. An example is “if you keep promises, your friends will trust you” (p. 4). By contrast, few individuals perform above the next stage, formal operations. This formal logic stage of reasoning is more complex by its ability to coordinate one aspect of multiple abstractions. An example is “if people are going to get along, they have to trust each other, so it’s important to keep promises” (p. 4). People at this stage can connect variables via if-then propositions and other relations, and make arguments based on empirical or logical evidence. Once again, for brevity and simplicity, Rosenberg’s explications of his category of linear reasoning will

en flesh the political implications of these two different but similar cognitive stages.

Linear Reasoning

According to Rosenberg (2002), the three questions that concern linear thinkers are different, but structurally the same. “What is the consequence of and what is the antecedent of an observed action? This leads to a simple linear causal analysis” (p. 80). “What actions are the result of the same cause or produce the same effect? This type of question leads to a categorical analysis” (p. 81). “What is the correct sequence of actions that should unfold in a particular circumstance? Here the focus is on a whole sequence of actions” (p. 81). Answers to these questions derive from isolating concrete elements and placing them in relation to other elements, but in an unintegrated and non-systemic way, because the thinking is anchored in the concrete familiarity of the present environment. Causation: Mapped from the past or toward the future via concrete links, with which the thinker is already aware, in a unidirectional, non-systemic fashion. Time horizon: Consideration of past and future are extensive, but always anchored by their relation to the present. Units of thought: Concrete actions that are either personally observed or described by significant or respected others. Rules: Linear thinkers are heavily invested in social norms, laws, conventions, but cannot coordinate or prioritize among them in a principled way when complex situations invoke several applicable laws or norms at the same time. Per Commons et al. (2002) abstract linear thinkers function well in group settings such as their own or family’s company, and as filing clerks or typists. Formal linear thinkers function well in bureaucracy, in limited settings such as one-niche companies, and as secretaries, technicians, and whistle blowers.

The main characteristics of linear political reasoning can be understood from the following descriptions. From Rosenberg’s (1988) in-depth description of this form of political reasoning, space permits only limited treatment here. Political understanding: Able to discriminate between social and political domains and naturally analyze events’ characteristics and relations between them. Given the structure of reasoning, cannot redefine or critically evaluate political understandings because they are embedded in the socio-cultural environment from which they arise. Linear thinkers have scarce understanding of collective social phenomena. Political space: Extends the political domain to non-geography-bound activity. Since it is unable to construct integrated political reality, socio-cultural factors determine ideas, and assumptions about what is, and is not, considered political, and who is included in political consideration. Fragments of knowledge are considered one at a time, and with its anchoring “center-periphery structure,”

there is no systemic political understanding (p. 123). Political space is limited in that fashion; such thinkers cannot create alternative visions by thinking ‘outside the box’ and invoking principles to conceive “the possible, the moral, or the ideal” (p. 124). Political actors: Whether concretely perceived individuals, groups, or institutions, actors are seen either as agents or as targets of action, and agency is accorded higher status. Actors are mental aggregates of actions, labels, and other concretely assigned attributes, but never conceived as systemically “coherent wholes” (p. 126), and the category-assigning structure of thought creates dualistic labels or categories, into which it fits others. Institutions are hierarchically organized with specific responsibilities and functions that do not overlap with other institutions. People, within any given level of hierarchies, are assumed to be a homogenous group that acts in concert, a class of people of the same mind. Political action: Action is conceived as taking place in a mechanistic world of cause and effect, with people doing things in reaction to either external causes or internal dispositions, and no systemic qualities factor into causation. In-group/out-group categories characterize attitudes and action. The linear thinker “views politics as a stage filled with people, groups, institutions, and notions doing and saying things to one another” (p. 132). Note the political implications for democratization, that this formal stage of reasoning is the highest attained by most adults.

The next higher stage, systematic reasoning, does begin to use an early form of systems thinking, and only a relatively small portion of the population is found reasoning at this stage. Fewer still operate with meta-systematic reasoning enabling them to consider systems-of-systems in their thinking (Commons et al. 2002; Rosenberg 2002). With this overview of the deep structures—sequential and linear—that shape both thought and behaviors designed to meet basic needs, we have a lens through which to interpret challenges of democratization efforts and the players in them. The balance of this article provides vivid illustrations of *why* political science must employ these insights.

Interdisciplinary Scaffolding

The very scaffolding believed necessary to support a consolidated democracy also serves well as an organizing framework for my sketch of the import of integrating other disciplines’ insights, rigor, and structure to launch a new stage in democratization studies. This discussion cites some representative findings from existing studies to illustrate this thesis. Linz and Stepan (1996) identify five interacting and co-reinforcing developments necessary for a democracy to exist, which are: (a) conditions conducive to the development of a “free and lively” civil society (p. 7), (b) a political

society that is both valued and autonomous, (c) a rule of law ensuring freedoms including of association, (d) a state bureaucracy usable by the new democracy’s government, and (e) an institutionalized economic society. An influencing factor of major significance that weaves within and among each of these arenas is that of power, and it will be the sixth interacting element discussed below. As a result of introducing this new scaffolding, readers will be equipped to assess for themselves if they agree with Waterbury (1999), when he asserts that we do well to reject “the proposition of entrenched autocrats and ethnocentric social scientists: ‘This country ain’t ready for democracy’” (p. 261).

Conditions Conducive for Development of a Free and Lively Civil Society

The definition of civil society employed by Linz and Stepan reflects that of others who have also given it careful articulation (e.g., Fisher 1998; Turmanidze 2001): it is “that arena of the polity where self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests...[and] can include manifold social movements...and civic associations from all social strata” (p. 7). There are documented challenges to forming such a civil society. From the African continent (excluding South Africa): In urban based political parties, communal associations, and workers unions, from farmers to academics to doctors to artisans, *individuals* acted “almost unilaterally” on behalf of their groups, and worker unions were ineffectual and largely ignored (Bangura 1991, p. 22). From Estonia: People have paid a dear price in the aftermath of

the IMF model of monetary politics (shock therapy)...The calculation of the human development index shows a continued deterioration...The experience of transition after 7 years of independence has been, in part, one of social marginalization, large-scale disaster at the countryside, onslaught at labor, social disorientation (collapse of birth rates and increasing death rates suggesting deep-seated social and psychological crises). Increasing polarization of society, social deprivation, marginalization of large areas etc. has [resulted in] “coping” strategies...deepening alcoholism and drug use...[and] rise of illegal and semi-illegal activities. Pathological forms of civil associations as structures of social encampment have got some legitimization as “fair” against [the] unfair system (Rutsoo 2003, pp. 1–2).

An evident pattern during transitions is, the new elites that emerge not only fill the leadership vacuum that results

from an undeveloped civil society (Bangura 1991; Turmanidze 2001), but also have an “anti-civil society attitude” (Ruutsoo 2003). Even in instances of citizens empowered from below, their efforts are often suppressed from above or co-opted (Bangura 1991; Fisher 1998; Rosenberg et al. 1988). Conditions such as these abound in many forms, and situations of dominance, repression, subsistence existence, disease, etc., all contribute to the *overall decline* of individual, and collective cognition and conation (Chilton 1988).

Given these obstacles, creating the civic and political culture for democracy requires “the polity to pull itself up by its own boot straps by helping to create the very milieu in which it can flourish...[and this] is likely to require generations” (Murphy, as cited in Waterbury 1999, p. 266). Apparently caught in the optimism others left behind long ago, Waterbury (1999) still maintains that “one must entertain the possibility that a civic culture can be nurtured in the bosom of autocracy” and presumably be ready to blossom upon embarking on democratization, perhaps. For cognitive and conative progress toward civil society, there is a circular relationship. Some of the *practices* or *habits* of civil society are precisely those that can and do foster individual and social cognitive development. These include ample exposure to higher stage thinking, new and interesting social interactions and techniques, and “indigenous resolution at a higher stage of the ambiguities of an important social issue,” and certainly other methods as well (Chilton 1988, p. 86).

The dynamic, interacting conditions conducive to the development of any civil society, much less a “free and lively” one, are constrained by not only external social realities, but also people’s *internal* conditions: incapacity to act to meet basic needs and resulting coping strategies, and limited reasoning capacities to conceive or enact a civil society. Well-constructed theories of civil society recognize that the interactions of the state, the market, and the community play varying roles in constituting, corrupting, correcting, and collaborating, indicating a complex developmental social system (Tan 2001).

Political Society that is Both Valued and Autonomous

The explicit ideals of political society expressed by Linz and Stepan (1996) warrant their own words. It means that

arena in which the polity specifically arranges itself to contest the legitimate right to exercise control over public power and the state apparatus...The composition and consolidation of a democratic polity must entail serious thought and action, concerning the development of a normatively positive appreciation of those core institutions of a democratic political

society—political parties, elections, electoral rules, political leadership, interparty alliances, and legislatures—by which society constitutes itself politically to select and monitor democratic government (p. 8).

Commonly presumed an integral player in any democratic society, political parties receive substantial attention throughout the transition literature. One typology of parties is an extensive matrix explicating the pluralistic and proto-hegemonic forms taken by numerous configurations of elite, ethnicity-based, electoralist, and movement parties, the extent of their organization, and their categories of goals, electoral strategy, structure and linkages, and social bases (Diamond and Gunther 2001). While parties are seen as a form of developing, exhibiting, and enacting political cohesion, they are also clearly a nexus for “volatility and fragmentation” (Ozbudun 2001, p. 241). That plays one of the contributing roles in invocations of Darwin’s “survival of the fittest” provoked by examination of the “political Darwinism” of parties in Latin America (Coppedge 2001). Study of political parties reveals a vivid portrait of how anthropology and developmental psychology have inextricable roles for understanding the party aspect of political society. The study by Coppedge, a professor of government, could have appeared in an anthropology text with its examples of developing countries’ well-known and various forms of pervasive “local notable” and clientelist political institutions (pp. 174–177). Political scientists tend to lump all clientelism in one category, but the patron–client relationship is one stage further in cognitive development (Chilton 1988). While both forms are dyadic relations, sequential reasoning’s primary stage’s moral reasoning is a feudal “eye for an eye” that employs the positive exchange of bribery and the negative exchange of often-endless revenge. Corresponding to the local group structure of anthropology’s *big man* societies, this primary stage reasoning is reflected in the Palestinian conflict, where we see this stage’s inability to conceive a way out of the vicious circle.

Sequential reasoning’s concrete stage patron–client relations are mutually maintained relationships such as those between lord and vassal (Chilton 1988), or the peasant economies of the agrarian state (Johnson and Earle 2000). The patron–client form of clientelism is a system of trade or bartering for mutual benefit because each party has some good or service wanted by the other. For the client, this is a secure paternalistic patronage that helps assure that basic social, economic, and health and welfare needs are met (Chilton 1988; Johnson and Earle 2000). Each form of clientelism is well below the stages capable of political society, and both represent the anti-thesis of democracy in their practices, only one example of which are reports of patrons’ practices of telling their clients how to vote in societies where it exists (Coppedge 2001; Johnson and Earle 2000).

Another factor for developing political society connects the issue of adult development with voting practices and ethnic identifications. In an examination of Kosova's first and second elections, "most analysts agree on the assessment that Kosovar voters largely vote out of leadership [more] than any policy or ideological considerations, a thesis supported by several surveys" (Pula 2002, pp. 18–19). There, as elsewhere, the "rigid electorate" unchangingly backed parties of their own ethnic affiliation (p. 17). The adherence to voting for perceived leadership arises not necessarily only from sequential reasoning, but also as Pula (2002) argues, that leaders' background in resistance politics does not equip them to understand governance issues or policy questions. Campaigning was characterized by expansive promises of public improvements to schools, jobs, and services, and claims to leadership competency "centered around past glory and the status issue" (p. 19).

An unusual experiment—perhaps critical insight—into how to integrate a peoples' stage of socio-political development with transitioning to a democratic system arises from Uganda's dictator Museveni in the late 1980's through at least the mid-1990s (Waterbury 1999). The draft of a new constitution stipulated that for 4 years after the initial election of a parliament, a "movement regime" would rule and electoral candidates could not be party-affiliated. "Museveni has gone on record that multipartyism will descend rapidly into tribalism, and parties must wait until there is a large middle class" (Balzar, as cited in Waterbury 1999, p. 268).

Where intractable enmities play their roles in precluding the genesis of a civil political society, yet other unusual processes are needed to expand the political reasoning and universe of citizens. These require sustained effort over time, and time is a crucial political party in the development process (see Saunders 1999). Addressing this broad issue of developing a political society, quoting Museveni's political reasoning provides insights suitable for concluding this discussion.

We need to reach the point where there is competition between interests, not identities. Today you have Buganda against Acholi. That is very unhealthy. But once you have employees struggling against employers, ah! There is no way an employer will want to massacre all his employees. There will be struggle, yes, but neither side wants to get rid of the other (Balzar, as cited by Waterbury 1999, p. 281).

Rule of Law Ensuring Freedoms

The task of developing a society that understands, values, and enforces rules of law that ensure *freedoms* presents the

same sorts of conundrums as the foregoing discussions highlight. First, people must, to some degree, understand—and accept—the abstract *concepts* of law, freedom, rights, and responsibilities. Second, there must be *reason* to trust the law to assure and preserve the kind of social contract that meets basic human needs, else people will return to fending for themselves or coping through whatever avenues they conceive. These capacities do not reside in the general populations of many developing countries. Where laws are enacted in many of them it becomes a tool for new forms of corruption. Bangura's (1991) analysis of countries across the African continent is representative of the stories generated across the globe, in which individuals in the ranks of government, and national and transnational corporations wield power and use their influence to increase their wealth-accumulation at the expense of the rest of the citizenry who are kept under control and dependent. Neither this central issue, nor any of the other systemic issues discussed here, can be approached and understood without systematically employing interdisciplinary expertise.

State Bureaucracy Usable by New Democratic Government

The Linz and Stepan (1996) argument for having a functioning state bureaucracy for new democratic governments rests on a chain of reasoning that makes the following connections. Since democracy is a governance system that protects and guarantees citizens' rights, it needs the monopoly on legitimate use of force to extend those protections and provide other basic public services. In order to accomplish even only these rudimentary services, it must be able to generate revenue via compulsory taxation to pay for enforcing the rule of law with police and a judiciary. In sum, modern democracies "need the effective capacity to command, regulate, and extract" (p. 11). Examining some of the ways and means of bureaucratic transitions, the authors discuss how previous regimes' structures indicate particular tasks and paths needed, the pacts involved that may take a range of forms from non-democratic to democratic, and questions unique to whether military or civilian leadership takes the new helm. One of the most crucial institutional issues never gets asked: are the new users of the institution capable of the reasoning implied by the institution's structure? Institutional structures that "fit," reflect the stage of development of their users. Bureaucratic systems reflecting linear stage thinking are consistently subject to corruption when "moved into" by sequential reasoners (Chilton 1988; e.g., the Russian experience).

Other research highlights that the macro-level attention to the state machinery leaves related, important, other systemic issues unaddressed. In Kosovo, the operations of

commissions in overseeing tight electoral campaign rules during the transition raise broader questions of “whether the [United Nations’ Mission in Kosova and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission can set up indigenous structures and processes that facilitate rather than hamper democratic politics” (Pula 2002, p. 20). The Kosovar experience points to the larger problem coming to the fore. Research into experiences in Georgia, another divided society, produced the finding that “observing institutional building in transitional countries, many ‘transitologists’ have concluded that suitability of the institutions depends on environment, and as the environment changes in unpredictable ways, efficiency of the borrowed institutions in the short run may turn into inefficiency in the long run” (Grabher and Stark, as cited in Turmanidze 2001, p. 1).

State machinery-building and transitions from autocratic states can be approached in other ways, as Uganda’s experience with Museveni’s counter-intuitive reasoning continues to inform us via Waterbury’s (1999) discussion. He included several old kingdoms into the political society to afford some legitimation to the important players. In an earlier move, he overturned Idi Amin’s popular 1972 expulsion of the Asian Indian population, allowing them to return with ownership of their prior properties and businesses. Beyond these moves, his strategy to transform his army into a party-free regime movement for the early years of democracy included the plan to subject the newly drafted constitution to a protracted vetting process that extended for about 7 years. Amid recurring cries of the process being manipulated and taking too long, and subsequent judgments of strategic error, reports reveal notable worthwhile outcomes. Over those years, the constitutional commission members traveled in subgroups throughout Uganda to perform the top-down, didactic selling job of the draft’s merits to silent audiences. In a strategy to further consolidate his National Resistance Movement’s power, subgroups paid return visits to many communities. According to Waterbury (1999),

the top-down preachings turned into real town meetings. Exchange of views, often heated, replaced quiescence. The ostensible purpose of the exercise was actually achieved: average citizens learned a lot about constitutional issues. Some Ugandans feel that in the space of 4 years political culture, at least in some regions and for some strata, was fundamentally transformed. Deference toward the representatives of political power gave way to skepticism and criticism...Citizens became concerned with understanding their rights. Thus, a country without the socio-economic class, or cultural prerequisites of democracy may be an example of jump-starting a

transition. Its leadership does not consist of enlightened democrats; it has little social capital; and a significant part of the bourgeoisie is not even regarded as fully Ugandan (p. 269).

That unique story concludes with the overwhelming victory margin, with which Museveni won the first presidency of Uganda in its 1996 elections. One of the lessons we can extract from the story is the differences that result from strategies originating in different stages of political reasoning. We also see the dynamic of conation in citizens who wanted to know more about and wrestle with the provisions in the constitution. This came to pass as a result of the cultural norm implied by not only one, but two community visits by commission members. Passage of time between the events played an apparent role, as did cultural and institutionalized permission to discuss, debate, and question, openly and vigorously. These are democratic cultural norms and practices. Lastly, the transparent information sharing, which began with intent to sell or persuade, may have implied to citizens their pre-existing “joint ownership” of the country, in contrast with elite modes of operation that lack transparency. The selling may have derived from Museveni’s apparent linear formal reasoning strategy to win future voters, yet the report suggests it had perhaps unintended positive and developmental impacts. When research is analyzed through a developmental lens, new patterns, new lessons, and new insights appear.

Institutionalized Economic Society

In every society, there are forms of institutionalized economies that correspond to the micro- and macro-levels of socio-political development within the society. The high state of system integration required of a consolidated democracy, is evident in the Linz and Stepan (1996) definition of an economic society when they say it is “a set of socio-politically crafted and socio-politically accepted norms, institutions, and regulations, which we call *economic society*, that mediates between state and market” (p. 11, emphasis in original). Asserting the checks and balances required between market autonomy and diverse ownership are vital to producing the kind of civil society necessary in a democracy, they cite the role of democratically constituted controls.

The stories from Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin American cited throughout this discussion reflect not only the inevitable difficulties of transitions to democratically controlled economic systems, but also anthropology’s insights that the scales of institutional attention to basic needs and developmental levels vary from the local to the

national. These factors make democratization a dramatic process because “it represents a monumental, difficult, and often fragile triumph over the self- and family-centered practices—corruption, gangsterism, oligarchy, and fraud, as well as various forms of local protests against incorporation into the larger political economy—that would destroy it” (Johnson and Earle 2000, p. 378).

Aware of stable democracy’s real nature as an “interacting system,” the providers of this discussion’s framework articulate the matrix of systemic interaction, organizing principles, and mutually reinforcing roles and supports of the five major arenas that their study suggests as essential for a modern consolidated democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996, pp. 14–15). A genetic epistemological analysis emphasizes that in unstable societies, such as those in transitions, there are diverse sources of social change, such as new norms of legitimation and the instability arises from the interaction of dissimilar systems (Rosenberg et al. 1988). Those interactions are characterized by power relations, and lead us to the last consideration in this limited sketch of democratization’s arenas.

Power and Political Consciousness

Many believe politics is all about power. The foregoing sections reveal that it is certainly also about human beings’ basic welfare, security, and safety, and their motivations and capacities to be effective political actors in and on their environment. Genetic epistemology, with its study of how humans adapt to and organize their environment, has much more to say about power relations and the psychological adaptations to them than this space can convey. It will have to suffice to briefly mention only several aspects of this dimension of politics included in Rosenberg et al.’s discussion of power and political consciousness.

Already clear from introducing the developmental approach earlier in this article, is the reality that people at different stages of developing reasoning structures perceive others, actions, events, institutions, and their relations to each of these very differently. These perceptions are also called meaning-making, and employing them is sometimes called constructing meaning. When it comes to considering power relations, there are also “power processes behind the social construction of meaning” (Gaventa, as cited in Rosenberg et al. 1988, p. 164). How those processes operate in different people in different environmental circumstances differs. Citing the commonplace awareness that what we see depends on where we are sitting, the authors discuss research showing how people in subordinate positions, individually and collectively, tend to adapt to such circumstances by internalizing—adopting—the

worldviews, beliefs, and rules, interpretations of those in authority.

Further, in extreme situations, this dynamic can result in a “structure of infantilization which seeks to destroy individual identity, reducing the subordinate to childlike dependence on authority. Only in infancy did other persons, our parents, have the power to throw us into desperate inner turmoil if our wishes conflicted with theirs” (Betelheim, as cited in Rosenberg et al. 1988, p. 165), and to escape that serious desperation—and its acknowledgment of basic needs denied—the less powerful adopt the stance and views of the powerful, adjust their behavior accordingly, and thus resolve the unbearable disequilibrium. Finally, the authors cite a “masterful treatise on the social origins of obedience and revolt” (p. 165) that observes a “widespread human tendency to interpret the clauses of the implicit social contract for the rulers’ benefit” (Moore, as cited in Rosenberg et al. 1988, p. 165). This last factor, with which this discussion closes, is of paramount concern in democratization efforts, because as the literature makes resoundingly clear, the social contract is expected to meet, and is essential for meeting, citizens’ most fundamental human needs, regardless of their stage of development, and plays an intrinsic role in furthering their internal and external development as well.

A Compelling Theoretical Framework

This article as a whole points to a compelling theoretical framework for democratization, the lack of which I decried early on, in company with Anderson, and Haggard and Kaufman. This general framework has been in the public domain for over two decades. Habermas (1979) appears to be the first to articulate it in a comprehensive albeit philosophical way. About a decade later, Rosenberg et al. (1988) published research-grounded articulations of such a framework. For everything, there is a season, and the overall state of the planet cannot afford for us to continue to ignore it.

The arguments presented herein clearly situate democratization in the arena of political development. (To avoid associating this term with common connotations of economic development, and to reflect its comprehensive scope, I prefer to use the term *integral political development*). Chilton (1988, 1991) has done an impeccable job of both defining and grounding political development theory. His theory incorporates the moral reasoning stage theory of Kohlberg, which is based on the Piagetian cognitive structures used in this article. Given the scope of what this article has already covered, I will capture only its essential features, and refer readers directly to his work.

As Chilton (1988) has conceived it, political development is defined in terms of changes in political culture. Culture is admittedly closely related to both changes in individuals' attitudes and in empirically identified patterns of social interaction, but the power of this theory is in its explication of political culture. This anchoring to the political culture resolves the "classic 'micro/macro' problem that has long bedeviled political psychology" (Pye 1997, p. 242). In his well-developed presentation, Chilton (1988) asserts that

political culture consists of all publicly common ways of relating. These ways of relating, dealing with the same problems faced by systems of moral reasoning—how people are to relate to one another—are structured in the same manner as Kohlberg has found moral reasoning to be structured...Thus political cultures may also be arranged in a sequence in which "higher" in the sequence means both "psychologically more integrated and differentiated" and "philosophically and morally more adequate." Development refers to the cognitive structure underlying the culture, however, not to the specific cultural content. Locating political development in the cultural system admits several sources of change: change due to cognitive-developmental forces; change due to social inertia; and change due to hegemonic control over available cultural alternatives (p. 14).

Development is a messy, chaotic process by any definition, and there are equally dynamic interpenetrating influences in individual, collective, and institutional ways of relating, each of which exerts influence on the others. This complexity demands a compelling theoretical framework, and Chilton's is both that, and a relatively straightforward and simple one. It has correspondence to anthropology, and while it correlates to other developmental stage theories, it is an integrated dynamic whole, while they are not. The complexity accommodated by Chilton's theory "explains why simple theories of political development have been doomed to failure...Theories of simple unilinear progression cannot encompass development's complexity" (p. 98).

And democratization research, theorizing, and implementation cannot afford to fail to treat the complexity inherent in the transition process nor fail to employ a well-crafted, integral framework such as Chilton provides. An equally passionate collegial voice closes this discussion.

Given the methodologies and the scope of our concerns, unless there is a major redirection of effort toward a Paigetian analysis of political thought, and unless our numbers begin to rival those following the Lockean paradigm, the wheels of political science

will continue to spin in place upon faulty assumptions about the nature of human thought" (Rosenberg et al. 1988, p. 162).

Conclusion

Let us hasten the employment of wisdom to inform transitions, but not attempt to hasten transitions. Let us be realistic about the truly evolutionary nature of transition efforts, and help their citizens be truly realistic about the cost and confusion that are adaptive and evolutionary dynamics. Let us take off our Western blinders and see the world through its multi-leveled eyes, and not inflict our assumptions blindly. Let us focus less on the perceived "end state" of democracy, seen as panacea for all needs, and realistically attend to meeting the basic human needs that seek panacea. Let the midwifery of birthing healthy human societies be conscious of the pain and the labor involved in delivering our interdisciplinary skills to the slow evolution of humanity that this democratization story is really all about.

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